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Abstract. In this paper we will present some schemes for strengthening network 
authentification over insecure channels with biometric concepts or how to securely transfer 
or use biometric characteristics as cryptographic keys. We will show why some current 
authentification schemes are insufficient and we will present our concepts of biometric 
hashes and authentification that rely on unimodal and multimodal biometrics. Our concept 
can be applied on any biometric authentification scheme and is universal for all systems. 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
As we all know storing passwords in plaintext is considered insecure, so cryptographic 
hashes are used to obsufurcate plaintexts. A cryptographic hash takes a plaintext, and then 
calculates a hash value from it. Cryptographic hashes should always give unique output for 
and similar applications. 
If two inputs for a hash function produce the same output that means the hash has a 
collision and it is considered insecure. Also, cryptographic hash functions must be 
irreversible. Most common hash functions today are: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 
[4], WHIRLPOOL and TIGER.  
bruteforce attacks, rainbow tables [8], CRC tables [3], Modified CRC tables [7]. Also hash 
der to break if they obtain a large input, and that is the main 
concept on which biometric hashes derive their security. Because normal passwords are 
varied in size and ranges, but most common user passwords are weak and easily defeated 
with rainbow cryptanalysis. Our concept of biometric hashes has an extremely long input 
and is nearly impossible to reverse engineer since a brute force attack would be infeasible 
and a rainbow table would be simply too big. 
 
 
 
                                                 
Shown results came out from scientific project (Methodology of biometrics characteristics 
evaluation 016-0161199-1721), supported by Ministry of science, education and sport 
Republic of Croatia. 
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2.   FAILURE OF CLASSIC HASHES ON MODERN CRYPTANALYSIS 
 
The main failure point of classic password authentification systems is that users 
commonly use weak passwords of under eight lowercase and uppercase alpha characters 
with numbers or use phrases that are found in dictionaries [11]. On figure 1 we show how 
classic tables are correlated to various variables. We assume that the chain number in table 
will be 40 million, since that is the most practical size of a table, and for example, we will 
take the MD5 hash[9]. Benchmarks were done on a 1.4 GHz Pentium-M processor, 1Mb L2 
cache with 512 Mb Ram, so a cluster system would be more powerful and would take 
significantly less time while also it could parallelize all actions. On fig. 1 we show the 
correlation of the input character size (a- for lowercase characters, A for uppercase 
characters, 0 for numerics), and the length of the password (for example 1-7 for passwords 
of 1 to 7 characters) Chain length is the rainbow table chain length in the table. 
 
Figure 1. Classic Rainbow Table size 
 
As we can see, classic rainbow tables become infeasible with large datasets. This can 
be softened with the use of our modified CRC tables that use longer processing time to find 
the hash, but are smaller. Also tables can have longer chain lengths to compress them. This 
generation can be done on a clustered system, so generating the last example table can be 
about one month with less than a day of cryptanalysis for any number of hashes. This 
crack and that large passwords, of mixed input sets are extremely difficult to crack and this 
is the basic concept of biometric hashes. 
 
3.    BIOMETRICS, UNIMODAL AND MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC 
       SYSTEMS 
 
Since we want to use biometric characteristics in our work, we will define some 
prerequisites for our systems. 
The favored biometric characteristic is [6]: 
 Fast to process and acquire 
 Unobtrusive to the bearer 
 Preferably contact-less 
 Unique 
 
Also, we prefer the usage of multimodal systems. Multimodal systems are systems that 
use more then one biometric characteristic to authenticate a user where unimodal systems 
use only one characteristic. Also the characteristic must have a distinct output that can be 
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used for a biometric hash, or we must be able to create an eigenvector. This means that the 
output can be similar to a password, and thus can be compared in hashed form. The other 
variant is that we transfer and store / use biometric characteristic in encrypted form with 
stronger asymmetric cryptographic algorithms like RSA or ElGamal. 
 
4.    BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION CONCEPT 
 
4.1 ENROLLMENT 
 
First, a person must be enrolled. Enrollment is collecting a persons biometric 
characteristics, over multiple times so a referent sample can be acquired [1]. For biometric 
characteristics, several can be predominantly best for biometric authentication, like 
keystroke dynamics and other variants that can hold a precise value and don't require any 
special type of conversion for usage. For multimodal authentication, we must obtain all the 
characteristics that will be used. The more characteristics we acquire, we will have more 
characteristics we can use for characteristic rotation. The main principle is that we acquire 
multiple characteristics, and use a fixed number for authentication . For example, if we 
enroll ten fingers and use two for authentication, which means that each time we can 
request two different fingers for authentication. This method can reduce and harden 
ous individual acquires a 
characteristic and tries to present the acquired characteristic). This method is simple for 
users, and hardens existing systems. After collection and processing, the templates are 
stored in a database. 
 
4.2.  MODEL FOR BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
Here we can present the concept of the biometric authentication model, based on hash 
functions on figure 2. 
This concept is very easy to comprehend. First off, the system selects a number of 
biometric characteristics that will be used for authentication. Then we extract features and 
patterns that we will need for the processing part. Processing part must create a value (like 
base. The authentication is done like with any other hash system as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2.  Model for biometric authentification 
 
Figure 3. Simple hash authentication 
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As we already said, the principle failure of password systems is the size of the 
passwords which can be reverse engineered with use of modern cryptanalytic methods. 
Biometric templates or characteristics are complex and large, and have a uniform 
distribution. This is a very good quality, since a person who would want to create a CRC, 
M-CRC or Rainbow table would need a extremely large dataset, and thus a table would be 
gigantically large. Also, since the biometric characteristic is large, and we will need to 
utilize multiple rounds of a hash algorithm, and that adds to the complexity of the 
cryptanalysis.[5] 
The other method is to use asymmetric cryptography methods like ElGamal or RSA for 
transmission of the characteristic.  In that method, a biometric characteristic can be signed 
like any other document or file. Some public key encryption methods have been applied to 
be easily circumvented with USB MiTM like attacks (Replay attacks), Difference attacks 
and similar measures. If the system would be enabled to send a hash value with a nonce, 
that problem would be neutralized. 
 
4.4  BIOMETRIC CHARACTERISTIC AS MAIN OR SURROGATE KEY IN 
       CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS OR PKI INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
One other concept that can be used is to use the biometric characteristic as a decryption 
key for the smart card protected certificate or other cryptographic container. Since smart 
cards utilize cryptography, they 
successful attempts with timing attacks and smart-cards holding PKI information are 
considered mostly secure.  Also, a biometric characteristic can be used as a key in a 
cryptosystem. Here we will show some methods that can utilize this concept to strengthen 
existing cryptographic concepts. The outline of the system is shown in figure 4. 
The main feature is to create a cryptographic system that can utilize biometric 
characteristics as the key. Since we 
can enroll multiple characteristics and use characteristics rotation. After we have a 
characteristic, we have to hash it so each encodement will be unique and same. This can be 
done with eigenvectors or is native to some biometric characteristics like typing dynamics. 
This actually means the biometric hash can be of some arbitrary length like 256 / 512 / 
1024 / 2048 bit length and will be used as a symmetric key for our cryptographic container 
which can be implemented as we wish. After decryption with the biometric hash, we can 
extract the keypair or a key and use it in a standard encryption algorithm. If we want to use 
the model to store a certificate, we can also decrypt the certificate with the biometric hash, 
and the model is slightly changed 
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Figure 4. Biometric cryptography model 
. 
4.5   RESEARCH DATA CONCERNING CHARACTERISTIC ROTATION 
        AND OTHER NEW BIOMETRICS CONCEPTS  
 
Shown results came out from scientific project (Methodology of biometrics 
characteristics evaluation 016-0161199-1721), supported by Ministry of science, education 
and sport and we used that data in our research of this paper. From that results we found out 
that by using our CRC tables, we can effectively crack classic non salted hashes in a 
extremely short timespan. Also, the main point in trying to implement biometric 
cryptography is that we cannot effectively protect most of the biometric characteristics 
because of the simplicity of cracking some fingerprint scanners. 
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We tried with some characteristic compounds based on silicone-acrylic bases and 
natural gelatin. We found that silicone-acrylic bases with high moisture compounds can 
simply crack most modern multispectral optical sensors that rely on skin moisture, papillary 
lines and subdermal information to identify the person that holds the fingerprint. Since an 
attacker can simply crack that kind of sensors, with full stealth because the artificial 
fingerprints are thin (1 to 3 mm), we need to harden the acquire of fingerprints so that 
attackers cannot use them against the identification system. The simplest form is 
characteristic rotation that we mentioned earlier.  
 
4.6. IRIS RECOGNITION AS A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR BIOMETRIC 
       CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
Unlike fingerprints, thermography, hand geometry, facial images and similar non static 
methods, DNA and iris patterns remain static trough the entire lifetime. Since DNA is hard 
to extract and is a potential invasion of privacy, iris recognition shows as a promising hard 
method which is static and cannot be changed [2]. With great FRR and FAR rates for iris 
recognition it is a promising hard method that can be used in high security applications. 
Based on previous researches that have stated in common knowledge that the stromal 
pattern behind the cornea doesn't change in time, and that it can only be changed with 
physical force, severe illness or damage which would destroy   or damage the eye, we can 
conclude that the iris pattern can be uniquely extracted each time. If the pupil would dilate 
or contract based on the light, a constant intensity of light at the source can be regulated for 
scanning (as it is mostly done in some systems). That way a extracted iris pattern can be 
used in any concept that we shown in this work.  In the Picture 1. we show a prototype 
application that is used in our research.  
 
 
Picture 1. IRA  Iris recognition 
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Both stromal patterns from the image come from the same person. As we said, we can 
use the characteristics in any way that is specified in this work.  
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have shown some basic concepts that can be used to improve 
authentication methods like characteristics rotation, biometric hashes [10] and the concept 
how we can use biometric hashes for cryptographic purposes. Those concepts can be used 
to improve existing biometric authentication systems as concepts that are easily 
implemented.   
Also, on laptops we checked (Some early IBM T models and HP models with 
requested fingers for recognition, each time a different random pair.) 
Our future research will be concentrated on our biometric X509 certificates, and we 
will extend the basic concepts that we have shown. Also, with biometric X509, we are 
developing public key protocols that will use additional biometric authentication of both 
sides for secure asynchronous and synchronous communication. Since fingerprint readers 
are cheap, and come on some laptops as standard, and our nearly complete algorithms for 
rdware, it is possible that the typing dynamics, iris 
patterns, and fingerprints will be used as part of smart-card, mifare or RFID enabled 
certificate holders.  Also, some preliminary testing with biometric hashes (modified 
WHIRLPOOL hashes with eigenvalues for iris recognition have shown promise for the 
usage of the biometrics cryptography. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] 
lligent 
-291. 
[2] 
 
[3] Davis, J. H. Application of CRCs to TMTO. On-line: 
<http://www.md5lookup.com/?category=main&page=applications_of_crcs> acquired: 
21.5.2006 
[4] FIPS PUB  180-2: SHA-512 
[5] Hellman, M.E. (1980): A cryptanalytical time-memory trade off. IEEE Transactions on 
Information theory IT-26 
[6] 3. Savjetovanje o 
privatnosti i upravljanju identitetom. 
[7] 
authentication  systems, Conference proceedings of MIPRO 06, ISS section. 
[8] Oechslin, P. (2003): Making a Faster Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade-Off, 
Laboratorie de Securite et de Cryptographie (LASEC), Ecole Polytechnique Federale 
de Lausanne 
[9] RFC 1321: The MD5 Message Digest algorithm 
 
Journal of information and organizational sciences, Volume 31, Number 1 (2007) 
99 
[10] RFC 3174:  US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 
[11] Zalewski, M. Silence on the wire, a field guide to passive reconnaissance and indirect 
attacks. 2005, No Starch press. 
Received: 15 March  2007 
Accepted: 19 September 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
